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Tension Within the Church: British Missionaries in Wuhan, 1913–28

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The foreign missionary was always a prominent source of Sino-foreign friction. The appearance of Protestant missionaries in China's interior, and their intrusion into Chinese society in the latter half of the nineteenth century, caused strong resistance from the Chinese and many outbreaks of xenophobia. After the Boxer Uprising of 1900, however, this resistance and these outbreaks greatly declined. And the foreign missionary in the second and third decades of the twentieth century had to face new problems: namely, tension between the foreign and Chinese members within the church. In the late 1910s the missionaries found that their well-educated Chinese colleagues demanded equal treatment. Between 1925 and 1928 the missionaries and their Chinese members were involved in a severe conflict between 'foreign' Christianity and 'Chinese' nationalism, and this created even greater tension. How the missionaries responded to these problems, and how they influenced Christianity in China, deserve further analysis.

Yip Ka-che and Jessie Gregory Lutz have done thorough research on the anti-Christian movements of 1920–28. Both of them analyze the movements in the context of China's political and intellectual structures, and examine how they were affected by the May Fourth Movement of 1919, the May Thirtieth Movement of 1925 and the Nationalist Revolution of 1925–28. While Yip focuses more on how and why Chinese intellectuals and students opposed Christianity and missionary work, Lutz examines the interplay between the political parties and the anti-Christian campaigns.¹ Recently, Robert A.

This paper was first presented in the 1996 Modern Chinese History Workshop, Nuffield College, Oxford, on 'nationalism'. The author would like to thank all those who commented on it then, and in particular Robert A. Bickers, Roger R. Thompson and Philip Charrier for their reading and commenting on the later versions.

¹ Yip Ka-che, *Religion, Nationalism and Chinese Students: The Anti-Christian Movement of 1922–1927* (Bellingham, WA: 1980); Jessie Gregory Lutz, *Chinese Politics and Christian Missions: The Anti-Christian Movement of 1920–28* (Notre Dame, Indiana: 1988).

Bickers has pointed out that soon after the Nationalist Revolution, mission and church organizations led by missionary societies carried out a process of reform in order to adapt themselves to the new political circumstances.² All the mission schools were registered with the Chinese government, and Chinese heads replaced foreign heads in most of the churches, union organizations, and mission institutions in China. The result of these reforms was that 'missionaries found themselves generally working with, rather than over, Chinese Christians . . . and listening at last, rather than dictating, to them'.³

This paper narrows the focus to the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society (WMMS) in Wuhan, which was a relatively conservative and metropolitan-controlled mission in China's revolutionary centre. It argues that although the Nationalist Revolution proved to be a turning point for mission and church institutions in China, nevertheless some important efforts had already been made before this period to ease the tension between Chinese Christians and Western missionaries. Without these efforts, the sinification movement that came later would not have gone as smoothly as it did. This paper puts forward two further arguments. Firstly, it suggests that the resolution of internal conflicts within the WMMS in Wuhan in the late 1910s made it a less brittle organization when subjected to the tensions of 1925–28. The earlier conflicts, although personal in scope, actually had a broader reading in terms of patriotism as they reflected the desire of the Chinese mission elites to position themselves so as to make the greatest possible contribution to their country's development. These conflicts also affected elite relationships in the latter period, since they encouraged the mission to be more accommodating towards its well-educated Chinese workers. Secondly, it asserts that many of the same tensions continued during the period 1925–28, but were resolved with rather less acrimony. This occurred not only because of the pace of political upheaval, which forced the church officials to be pragmatic and to reform their institutions quickly without significant debate or disagreement, but also because of the integration of the interests of the British and Chinese mission elites.

² Robert A. Bickers, 'To Serve and not to Rule: British Protestant Missions and Chinese Nationalism, 1928–31', in Robert A. Bickers and Rosemary Seton (eds), *Missionary Encounters: Sources and Issues* (London: 1996), pp. 211–39.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 236.

British Missionaries in Wuhan

Protestant missionaries started to arrive in China in the early nineteenth century, but owing to the Chinese government's restrictions their activities were confined to China's coast. Longing to penetrate inland, British missionaries took the lead in advancing into Central China⁴ once the Qing government announced in the Treaty of Tianjin of 1858 that Hankou was open as a treaty port. Griffith John and Robert Wilson of the London Missionary Society (LMS) first reached Hankou in June 1861 and commenced work at a site near the newly-established British Concession. Several months later, Josiah Cox of the WMMS arrived from Canton. To avoid competing with LMS for converts, Cox decided to start his work at a site near the Han river, three miles away from the Concession.⁵

Both Griffith John and Cox chose Wuhan as their 'Christian bridgehead' because of its excellent geographical location. Wuhan formed a long-standing economic, political and educational centre in Central China. It was composed of three distinct cities—Wuchang, Hankou and Hanyang. Each of them stood on one of the banks at the confluence of the Yangtze and Han rivers. Through the Yangtze river and its numerous tributaries, they were in contact with almost all the provinces of inland China. Thus when British merchants regarded Wuhan an ideal site for penetrating the China market, to the missionaries it held the promise of saving the whole country from 'spiritual darkness'.⁶

Although both the WMMS and LMS boards did their best to send able men to China, the progress of their work in Wuhan in the first thirty years was slow. While the evangelistic work was gradually built up by means of street-preaching, book-selling and church services, their medical and educational plans were obstructed both by their own under-staffing and the hostile attitude of the Chinese gentry and local officials. It was not until the end of the nineteenth century that these difficulties were overcome.

⁴ Throughout this paper, the term 'Central China' will be used to refer to Hubei and Hunan provinces.

⁵ Norman Goodall, *A History of the London Missionary Society 1895-1945* (London: 1954), pp. 155-56; G. G. Findlay and W. W. Holdsworth, *The History of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society*, vol. V (London: 1924), pp. 462-3.

⁶ Findlay and Holdsworth, *History of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society*, p. 463.

In the 1890s, increasing numbers of medical and educational missionaries were sent to China. The arrival of such famous hospital and school builders as S. R. Hodge, R. T. Booth, Thomas Gillison, W. T. A. Barber, E. F. Gedye and A. J. Macfarlane provided a well-trained team for the provision of medical and educational services in Wuhan. China's political and institutional reform also helped to change the attitude of the Chinese gentry and officials toward the foreign missionary. In 1905, after having experienced successive defeats by foreign powers, notably Britain, France and Japan, the Chinese government decided to reform its political, military and educational systems based on Western models. The measures adopted in education included abolition of the long-existing civil-service examinations, creation of Western-style schools and encouragement of study abroad. Zhang Zhidong, the governor-general of Huguang, was one of the most enthusiastic advocates of the reforms. Most of the above measures had, in fact, been taken by him in Wuhan nearly a decade before.⁷ Although the overall effects of the educational reform programme in China were doubtful, Wuhan as a reform centre provided an encouraging atmosphere for mission schools. The abolition of the civil-service examination, in particular, created opportunities as it emphasized the importance of a Western curriculum at the expense of Confucian canon. Under the influence of the reform programme, the mission schools expanded and the number of students increased.⁸

In addition to the political and institutional reforms, the rapid development of Hankou in the early twentieth century as a commercial centre provided an even stronger impetus to the growth of mission schools and hospitals. This change started with the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, by which the Chinese government formally legitimized the establishment of foreign factories in China. This new opportunity for industry and trade brought the establishment of German, Russian, French and Japanese Concessions in Hankou in the two years after the treaty, which, added to the existing British Concession, greatly increased the area in which

⁷ Chuzo Ichiko, 'Political and institutional reform, 1901-11', in Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank (eds), *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 11 (Cambridge: 1980), pp. 376-9.

⁸ Su Yunfeng also attributes the expansion of mission schools in Wuhan to the new education system. See his *Zhongguo xiandaihua de quyuan yanjiu: Hubei sheng, 1860-1916* (Modernization in China, 1860-1916: A regional study of social, political, and economic change in the Hubei province) (Taipei: 1981), p. 144.

the foreign community could live.⁹ Furthermore, the grand trunk railway connecting Beijing with Hankou was opened to traffic in 1906, and its influence was soon felt in the influx of products from the agricultural regions of Henan and Hubei, notably sesame seed, beans, peas, cotton, and animal tallow. These changes coincided with the development of Hankou as a port for direct overseas shipment which allowed many more ocean vessels to sail up to Hankou to load and discharge cargoes during the high-water season. According to Joseph Esherick, the value of foreign trade in Hankou quadrupled between 1890 and 1910, thanks to the better means of transportation provided by steamship and railroad. This propelled the net value of whole trade of Hankou from 36,405,599 haikwan taels in 1890 to 135,299,167 in 1910.¹⁰

These new developments not only greatly enhanced Hankou's role as a market for inter-regional trade in China, but also provided many job opportunities for factory workers, harbour labourers and white-collar clerks. The demand for foreign-language-speaking Chinese in business firms, maritime customs and post offices encouraged Chinese parents to send their children to mission schools. Changing attitudes of the Chinese people to Western medicine also added to the importance of the mission hospitals.

Thus by 1910, after fifty years of endeavour, Hubei had become one of the leading missionary districts in China and the WMMS and the LMS were two of the three most dominant missions there—the third was the American Church Mission of the Protestant Episcopal Church (ACM). In this area the British missionaries had established one school for the blind, two colleges, several boarding schools and hospitals, many country schools, and more than twenty chapels. There was also a Union Normal School at Wuchang supported by four missions (WMMS, LMS, ACM and American Baptist Mission). In addition to the stations in the Wuhan tri-cities, the WMMS had circuits at Wuxue, Guangji, De-an, Daye, Anlu, Suizhou, Puqi, Hanchuan and Chongyang, all in Hubei (see Figure I). Its work in Hunan had developed so fast

⁹ Before 1895 Hankou was treated by the British merchants only as a commercial outpost and the population of the British Concession remained small. See William T. Rowe, *Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889* (Stanford: 1984), pp. 45-6.

¹⁰ Joseph W. Esherick, *Reform and Revolution in China: The 1911 Revolution in Hunan and Hubei* (Berkeley: 1976), p. 5; China, Imperial Maritime Customs, *Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1890*.




Fig. 1. The WMMS circuits in Hubei in the 1910s

- | | | | |
|------------|--------------|------------|-------------|
| 1. Anlu | 4. Hanchuan | 7. Hanyang | 10. Daye |
| 2. Suizhou | 5. Puqi | 8. Hankou | 11. Guangji |
| 3. De-an | 6. Chongyang | 9. Wuchang | 12. Wuxue |

that in 1906 the home society decided to separate it from Hubei and established a new Hunan district.¹¹

Although the WMMS and LMS had close co-operative relationship and shared similar progress, their policies in developing their work were in fact very different. Being first in the field, the LMS chose a site next to the Concessions. Its location and the fact that the LMS was inter-denominational in constitution and personnel enabled it to found a union church in the Concessions and maintain close contact with the business community. It was therefore in a better position to attract local financial support.¹²

The WMMS, on the other hand, focused on the native city. Financially, it relied more on grants and donations from home and had more metropolitan control. Once in a while it also received donations from the Chinese compradores or the British Chambers of Commerce, but most of its missionaries considered that their duty was to serve the native city and believed that they should not spend too much time in the Concessions. Dr W. Arthur Tatchell, for example, was the only missionary in the WMMS who had a close relationship with the business community and was thus relatively successful in raising funds for their Hodge Memorial Hospital.¹³ But in 1916, when he requested permission to resign so as to be a private doctor in the British Concession, the criticism of his colleagues revealed that they thought Tatchell had spent too much time in the Concession and not enough in his hospital.¹⁴

The WMMS home society also treated financial assistance from the business community with more caution. In 1922 the British Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai resolved to provide Wesley College with \$2,500 per year to support one more British teacher.¹⁵ After careful consideration, the WMMS board, following the lead of the Conference of British Missionary Societies, published a conditional acceptance of the offer that reads as follows:

¹¹ Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society Archives in the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London [Hereafter MMS] Microfiche 499/120, Minutes of the Wuchang Local Committee Meeting in January 1910. 499 represents the box number and 120 the fiche number.

¹² The LMS usually maintained their hospitals by funds raised from within the Concessions. See MMS 963/354, H.B. Rattenbury to C.W. Andrews, 8 Nov. 1923.

¹³ MMS 959/284, Marginal note by Tatchell on the circular letter of Hodge Memorial Hospital of March 1914.

¹⁴ MMS 960/293, J.K. Hill to Henry Haigh, 21 Aug. 1916.

¹⁵ MMS 962/339, British Chamber of Commerce to Wesley College, 24 Feb. 1922.

The British Missionary Societies especially desire to make it perfectly clear that the fundamental purpose of their work makes it necessary to avoid the possibility of any suspicion that their schools exist to foster British trade or political influence in China. These Societies will gratefully accept the offered assistance on the express understanding that in so doing their schools are not debarred from entering into a federation scheme with other schools directed or supported by non-British Missionary Societies and leading up to union universities; and also that they are left completely unfettered as to their organization, policy and teaching, both religious and secular.¹⁶

Owing to the relatively conservative attitude and policies of the WMMS, it will be instructive to examine how it coped with the tension caused by its Chinese members' demand for equal treatment in 1916–20.

Tension in the Mission

Whether their services were evangelical, educational or medical, WMMS newcomers to China had to spend a year studying the language before they were considered useful for missionary work. Although many missionaries continued to perfect their Chinese after the pioneer period, it was gradually felt that preaching to the Chinese would be more effective if done by native Chinese. Moreover, it had been the goal of the missions to establish self-governing churches. It therefore became a trend for the home societies to request their missionaries to train Chinese pastors and preachers.¹⁷ In the early twentieth century there appeared many Chinese ministers in Wuhan.

Apart from training Chinese ministers, in some special cases the WMMS also arranged for selected students to study in England. Shen Wenqing and Jiang Huchen (1883–1962) were such cases. Both Shen and Jiang had been educated in the WMMS mission schools. Shen was one of the first four graduates of Wesley College¹⁸ while Jiang was recommended to St John's University in Shanghai to do his first degree, and then in 1907, supported by a fund raised by Dr Hodge, was sent to Edinburgh to study medicine.¹⁹

¹⁶ MMS 962/340, Andrews to Rattenbury, 13 July 1922.

¹⁷ Goodall, *History of the London Missionary Society*, p. 162.

¹⁸ Gong Zhangyou, 'Wuhan jiaohui xuexiao yi pie' (A glimpse of the mission schools in Wuhan), unpublished paper, 1983, pp. 19–21.

¹⁹ *Wuhan renwu xuanlu* (Personalities in Wuhan), ed. by Editorial Board for Historical Accounts of Past Events in Wuhan (Wuhan: 1988), pp. 481–3; E. F. Gedye, 'The story of Dr Chiang', *Foreign Field* (April 1917), pp. 148–9.

In 1913, both Shen and Jiang finished their studies and returned to Wuhan. The former earned his Bachelor of Arts²⁰ and the latter took his degree of M.B. and B.Sc. in the Edinburgh University and finished a course of postgraduate work in several leading London hospitals.²¹ Both of them were as well-educated as or even better educated than some of the European missionaries. Thus began new relationships between the British and Chinese workers in the mission, and new difficulties. Some of the latter were foreseen by G. A. Clayton in preparation for Jiang's return:

We do not know whether he [Jiang] is classed under 'European'. . . . I need not say that we all look forward to Mr Chiang's [Jiang's] return, but we feel that the problems of keeping him in close touch with the Chinese workers rather than with the foreign workers is one that will not be easily solved as he is naturally on a different plane to any other Chinese worker we have ever had.²²

Jiang and Shen were different from other Chinese workers but they were also not Europeans. They were therefore put in a position somewhere in between, with regard to both salary and status. Jiang was sent to the mission hospital in Daye and Shen worked under the superintendent of Hankou. They proved to be good, hard workers. Shen's ability was recognized by several inter-denominational organizations including the China Continuation Committee and the YMCA in Shanghai, which attempted to persuade the WMMS to release him so that he could act as their Chinese Secretary.²³ Jiang's service in Daye was also appreciated. He was highly respected by the local gentry and merchants who were willing to make liberal contributions to his projects.²⁴ It was admitted that Jiang was 'exerting a gracious influence upon men whom the European missionary would have found it difficult to reach'.²⁵

Both men, however, grew increasingly dissatisfied with their work and the treatment they received from the European missionaries, and their frustration came to a head in the late 1910s. As well-educated and foreign-trained professionals, both Shen and Jiang

²⁰ MMS 500/141, Minutes of the Wuchang Local Committee Meeting in January 1913.

²¹ MMS 961A/321, Report of the Chinese Medical Student's Fund by J. Wilcox Edge, July 1914.

²² MMS 959/272, G. A. Clayton to Andrews, 1 Sept. 1912.

²³ MMS 961A/321, Hill to Andrews, 22 Oct. 1918.

²⁴ MMS 961A/321, Interview with Jiang by W. Rowley on 23 May 1918, enclosed in Rowley to Edge, 24 May 1918.

²⁵ Findlay and Holdsworth, *History of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society*, p. 520.

longed for more demanding jobs in accordance with their new status. In an age when Chinese nationalism was forming, Shen was anxious to work among students and soldiers in a larger field and scope. He wished to be free from pastoral charge so that he could visit other circuits, districts and churches for special services.²⁶ Besides longing for more useful work, the racial problem in the mission also upset him. In 1916, Shen suddenly decided to resign. The comments of H. B. Sutton on his resignation demonstrate that not all of Shen's colleagues appreciated his ambition:

I am sorry Shen Wen Chin [Shen Wenqing] is going. But he seems so determined I think it will be best to let him go. As a preacher he is splendid. As a pastor he is not a success. He of course has been away a lot, but I am sure the Church has suffered through lack of pastoral oversight. A less brilliant man would serve us better. I am not saying this to belittle Shen. He is a special friend of mine, and comes in here daily as my foreign colleagues do. But he seems cut out for the big work, and we want a man who will stick to his own work, and build up the Church.²⁷

After several interviews, the Wuhan Local Committee gradually realized that the direct cause of Shen's resignation was the strained relationships between the British and Chinese in the mission. Shen felt that 'somehow there is a difference in the status of a foreigner and a Chinese and that things which would not be done in the case of a foreigner are done in regard to the Chinese'.²⁸ He brought forward several such instances and admitted that one particular case in which he felt he had been made to lose face caused his resignation. J. K. Hill, the chairman of the district, and other interviewers asked Shen to give a clear statement of his grievances in the district synod. But they came to realize that his intention was 'in true Chinese way to resign and then speak clearly'.²⁹

Shen's 'Chinese' way of submitting his resignation was not appreciated by his foreign colleagues. He was criticized by several of them who wished he had 'acted in a more honourable fashion'.³⁰ However despite this cultural clash, the mission did its best to persuade Shen to stay. Hill promised to set up a special committee for similar cases, and also agreed to let Shen have more time to work

²⁶ MMS 961/307, Hill to Andrews, 1 Nov. 1917.

²⁷ MMS 960/305, H. B. Sutton to Haigh, 9 Dec. 1916.

²⁸ MMS 961/309, Hill to Andrews, 14 May 1918.

²⁹ MMS 961/307, Hill to Andrews, 11 Sept. 1917.

³⁰ MMS 961/308, B. S. Bonsall to Hill, 15 Jan. 1918.

among students.³¹ After all his conditions were met, Shen withdrew his letter of resignation.

No sooner had Shen's case had been settled than Jiang alerted his superiors of his intention to resign. Although he had earned the respect of the local gentry, Jiang did not consider his work in Daye a success. Compared to Hankou, Daye was an 'untouched' city. The church there was stagnant and the hospital was small, with only one doctor. Modern hospital facilities and supplies were wanting. The house which the mission gave him was an adapted Western-styled one. Big though it was, from the Chinese point of view it was a warehouse, not a living place. What upset Jiang most was that he was not trusted with the administration of the hospital, or its finances. He was subjected to the oversight of whatever superintendent happened to be appointed to the circuit.³²

Under these circumstances, Jiang welcomed the opportunity offered to him by Liu Zijing, the compradore of the Russian tea firm, Molchanoff, Pechatnoff & Co., to help him to build up a modern hospital in Hankou.³³ Liu had already founded a high school called Fude in 1913, modelled after the mission schools and taught by Christian teachers. It was so successful that he was eager to open a hospital on the same basis. This project could help Jiang to fulfil his career objective, which was to establish and lead 'a well equipped hospital in Hankou under the management and control of an adequate and efficient staff or body of doctors, matron and nurses in a Christian atmosphere'.³⁴ Considering the success of the Fude High School, opened by a Chinese with Chinese money under Christian auspices, Jiang took the offer of becoming involved in building the new hospital as a call from God.³⁵

A more pressing consideration was financial. Jiang's stipend was fixed at £125 per annum while the European doctors earned £250 plus various allowances.³⁶ It was thought by the Mission House that as the cost of living in China was cheap the lower wages paid to

³¹ MMS 961/307, Hill to Andrews, 1 Nov. 1917.

³² MMS 961A/321, Interview with Jiang by Rowley on 23 May 1918.

³³ Liu Zijing (1884-1928) was one of the best-known young merchants in Hankou. Educated in Boone University of the ACM and being a member of the LMS, he was active in both business and Christian communities. See *Ibid.*; *Wuhan renwu xuanlu*, pp. 330-1; W. Feldwick (ed.), *Present Day Impressions of the Far East and Prominent & Progressive Chinese at Home and Abroad* (London: 1917), pp. 499-500.

³⁴ MMS 961 Hubei Chair/Gen 310, Jiang to Hill, 14 May 1918.

³⁵ MMS 961A/321, Interview with Jiang by Rowley on 23 May 1918.

³⁶ MMS 958/271, Andrews to Rowley, 30 Dec. 1912.

Jiang should be sufficient. However, since both Jiang's and his wife's family were poor, he had the responsibility of taking care of the relatives, which included educating two nieces, supporting his brother's business, and satisfying his elder relatives who came to him with their needs.³⁷ Every month the bulk of his salary went to his relatives. At the end of 1917, Jiang found himself in a state of financial crisis. In addition to this, Jiang had borrowed £180 from Liu when he was in England. The debt and the increasing financial burden drove him to resign in 1918. He planned to teach English at the YMCA in Hankou first and, after satisfying his creditor and relatives, to join Liu's project.³⁸

Jiang's resignation caused much more concern in the Mission House than had Shen's.³⁹ Jiang was the first Chinese doctor whom they had supported. Both those who had donated the funds and those who had administered the programme were reluctant to see him go.⁴⁰ For the missionaries in the field, Jiang's financial problems and ambitious programme for his future evoked feelings of both bitterness and sympathy. In his interview with Jiang, B. S. Bonsall could not refrain from asking rude and intrusive questions:

I said that if the mission had known he had such a large debt when he was in England there would have been great hesitation about engaging him. He replied with some warmth that it was his own private affair and he was never asked whether he had a debt. Then I asked if this money was spent in England and found that it was. I ventured to enquire why he found it was necessary to borrow that amount and once more felt the ruler on my knuckles. He said he had to live. The money according to him went in such expenses as boots, ties, collars etc. But surely these friends in England knowing that he was entirely dependent upon charity must have provided what they thought was necessary to carry him through with care. He said

³⁷ MMS 961/316, W. A. Cornaby to Andrews, 17 Aug. 1918. Little is known of the background of Jiang's wife. As for Jiang, he was born in a poor peasant's household. As his parents could not afford any more children, he was adopted by his childless uncle and then brought to Hankou. His adopted father was a 'water coolie', making a bare living by carrying water from the Han river to the people living in downtown Hankou. See Gedye, 'The story of Dr Chiang', *Foreign Field* (April 1917), pp. 148-9.

³⁸ MMS 961/308, Bonsall to Hill, 15 Jan. 1918.

³⁹ MMS 961/308, Andrews to Hill, 11 and 22 March 1918.

⁴⁰ J. Wilcox Edge, for example, who had taken care of Jiang when Jiang was in England and treated him as a son, went to the Mission House soon after receiving the news of Jiang's resignation and expressed that if it was caused by financial problems he was willing to provide more funds. See MMS 961/308, Andrews to Hill, 11 March 1918.

that he could not always be begging for money. . . . When he had calmed down . . . he said he had no alternative. The worry was killing him. Why should he live a short life? He wanted to insure his life and not be dependent upon a miserable pension like what we had arranged for him. Suppose he were to die tomorrow what would be the prospect for Mrs Chiang [Jiang], but to go once a month to the pastor for her few dollars as old Mr Tsao of the Baptist Mission does here? He wants to be independent.⁴¹

Jiang decided to be straightforward in the presentation of his grievances to his superiors so as to avoid the kind of criticism which Shen had received.⁴² Nevertheless, his European colleagues in China were bitter that Jiang had plainly listed the conditions under which he would continue to work in connection with the mission. These conditions were sent in the language of an 'ultimatum' to the WMMS General Committee in London. They made clear that Jiang wanted a mission doctor's house, to be stationed at Hankou, and a stipend of £250 per annum.⁴³

Jiang's colleagues knew that in the ACM those Chinese missionaries who were educated in the United States were paid the same salary as Americans.⁴⁴ The medical workers also admitted that Jiang was 'as valuable to the mission as a European doctor'. There was recognition that if the mission put Jiang at Hankou, his medical practice as well as his ability in fund-raising would bring the mission more income than the salary he requested.⁴⁵ On the other hand, the European officials could not refrain from feeling that 'having received his all from the Wesleyan Church he could have seen his way to make some sacrifice to her benefit and not leave her as soon as it suits his own convenience'.⁴⁶ Especially when the Mission House was both under-staffed and under financial pressure because of the First World War, it was felt that Jiang's ultimatum showed his selfishness and his lack of *esprit de corps*. 'The unspoken feeling as to whether a Chinese is as trustworthy as a foreigner' also crept up at this time.⁴⁷ It was felt that Jiang would definitely be the last Chinese doctor in the mission trained in England because the costs were too high.⁴⁸

⁴¹ MMS 961/308, Bonsall to Hill, no date (Friday).

⁴² MMS 961/308, Bonsall to Hill, 15 Jan. 1918.

⁴³ MMS 961 Hubei Chair/Gen 310, Jiang to Hill, 14 May 1918.

⁴⁴ MMS 961/316, Cornaby to Andrews, 17 Aug. 1918.

⁴⁵ MMS 961A/321, Hill to Andrews, 17 Aug. 1918.

⁴⁶ MMS 961/308, Bonsall to Hill, no date (Friday).

⁴⁷ MMS 961A/321, Rowley to Edge, 24 May 1918.

⁴⁸ MMS 961A/321, Hill to Andrews, 17 Aug. 1918.

These various feelings and grievances were aired at the Wuchang Local Committee meeting in August 1918. At the meeting the medical workers, though having complained of Jiang's tactics, agreed that Jiang should be treated as a European doctor and be given a stipend of £250. The preaching evangelists, however, were only willing to raise the amount to £180. After prolonged debate, it was at last resolved to recommend to the Mission House that Jiang's salary be raised to £220.⁴⁹

Hill as the district chairman, however, supported the case for £250. In his report to the Mission House, he pointed out that the salary which Jiang had requested was not as much as he could get elsewhere.⁵⁰ Moreover, since Jiang had agreed not to apply for any allowances, £250 actually covered everything. Hill emphasized: 'He is the only Chinese in our mission who has been educated abroad and therefore I think that an exception might well be made in his case. It will pay the mission and the Mission House to meet him.'⁵¹

After several long and divided discussions, the WMMS General Committee eventually adopted Hill's recommendation and accepted all Jiang's conditions.⁵² Jiang was moved to Hankou in 1921 and worked as one of four doctors in the Hodge Memorial Hospital. The Mission House's decision proved to be wise and brought many returns. Both Shen and Jiang stayed in the mission throughout the following three decades until foreign missionaries were forced to leave China in the 1950s. Jiang actually devoted all his life to the Hodge Memorial Hospital and retired as its head in 1957.⁵³ Most of all, Jiang's and Shen's cases eased the tension in the mission with the result that when the turbulent years of the 1925–28 came, the mission was in a better position to deal with them.

Foreign Mission and Chinese Nationalism

For British missionaries in Wuhan, 1925–28 proved to be the most difficult time they had yet experienced in China. Political upheavals

⁴⁹ MMS 961A/321, Report on Jiang's Case in the Wuchang Local Committee, 24 Oct. 1918.

⁵⁰ It was known that the Pingxiang Colliery Co. had offered Jiang a position with higher pay but he refused. See MMS 961A/321, Interview with Jiang by Rowley on 23 May 1918.

⁵¹ MMS 961A/321, Hill to Andrews, 17 Aug. 1918.

⁵² MMS 961A/321, Andrews to Hill, 28 Dec. 1918.

⁵³ *Wuhan renwu xuanlu*, pp. 481–3.

happened in succession and hit the British hard. First, there was the May Thirtieth Movement in 1925 in which the British-led Municipal Police shot and killed Chinese demonstrators in the International Settlement at Shanghai. This caused nation-wide anti-imperialist agitation.⁵⁴ Britain, as the leading imperialist power, was singled out for attack by boycotts and strikes. Mission schools and hospitals, which were regarded as the peaceful tools of imperialist invasion, suffered with other foreign institutes. Then the Guomindang (the Nationalist Party) armies captured Wuhan at the end of 1926. This government kept up its party spirit by encouraging anti-imperialist nationalism. Once they controlled Wuhan, labour unions encouraged workers of every trade to form a union. In quick succession the workers in the British firms, factories and schools, and even servants in the Concessions, all sent in demands and threatened strike-action. The worst happened on 3 January 1927 when demonstrating crowds threatened to break into the British Concession at Hankou, the British marines withdrew, and the Chinese army took control. One month later Britain formally surrendered this Concession. This caused great panic and an evacuation of foreigners from the Yangtze region.⁵⁵

In these difficult times, the Chinese Church came to regard foreign missionaries as a hindrance rather than a help. Afraid of being identified with the hated foreigners, Chinese Christians grasped every opportunity to prove their patriotism.⁵⁶ Torn between 'foreign' Christianity and 'Chinese' nationalism, relations between Chinese Christians and British missionaries became extremely tense.

In order to ease the tension, the WMMS missionaries in Wuhan launched several initiatives. First, they held a face-to-face meeting

⁵⁴ For the significance of the May Thirtieth Movement in the development of modern Chinese nationalism and in Sino-British relations, see R.W. Rigby, *The May 30 Movement: Events and Themes* (Canberra: 1980); Clifford, R. Nicholas, *Spoilt Children of Empire: Westerners in Shanghai and the Chinese Revolution of the 1920s* (Hanover: 1991).

⁵⁵ For the detail of Britain's surrendering her Hankou Concession, see Edmund S. K. Fung, *The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat: Britain's South China Policy, 1924-1931* (Hong Kong: 1991).

⁵⁶ Shen Haixia, the 'chief pillar' of the WMMS church in Anlu, for example, stirred up the city to patriotism soon after the May Thirtieth Movement. Not only did he lead a boycott and demonstrations, but he and other Christians tried to force all the WMMS members in the circuit to leave the WMMS and join a Chinese self-governing and self-supporting church. See MMS 963 Hubei Chair/Gen 360, Rattenbury to Andrews, 19 and 23 June 1925; MMS 963/366, Rowley to Andrews, 14 July 1925.

with their Chinese ministers in the summer of 1925.⁵⁷ At the request of the latter group, the missionaries went on to draft an open letter to state their attitude on the May Thirtieth Movement and the problem of the 'unequal treaties'. Insisting that a thorough inquiry be made by a proper authority, the missionaries stated: 'we earnestly hope that the programme of the Washington Conference will be so followed out, that, as early as conditions allow, by a peaceful method, satisfactory to all parties, the existing treaties may be so modified as to lead to mutual understanding and friendly co-operation between the people of China and those of other nations'.⁵⁸

This open letter was vague, and was obviously meant to be so, because the missionaries' opinions of the 'unequal treaties' were divided. On one side there were young professionals such as B. B. Chapman, who wished to see the privileges which the foreigners enjoyed in China renounced, and who believed that it was the only just and permanent solution to the present difficulties. He and other like-minded missionaries circulated statements in Britain and addressed letters to the responsible heads of the British government in the hope that Britain would 'avail itself of this great opportunity for proving its sincere friendship for China'.⁵⁹ On the other side were 'old China hands' such as J. S. Helps, who believed that the renunciation of extra-territoriality was impractical and unimaginable in an unstable and 'uncivilised' country like China.⁶⁰ The opinions of other missionaries ranged between these two extremes.⁶¹

While the lack of consensus prevented the WMMS missionaries from having a unified attitude toward the problem of the 'unequal treaties', in the spring of 1926 some educational missionaries made a new attempt to ease the tension. Since the early 1920s, the problem of registration had become a pressing issue in the mission schools. To integrate their schools into China's national system of education necessitated having a Chinese principal and a Chinese

⁵⁷ MMS 963/964, Hubei Gen/Chair 367, Rattenbury to Andrews, 13 Aug. 1925.

⁵⁸ MMS 963/964 Hubei Gen/Chair 367, A Letter to the Members of the Wesleyan Methodist Church in Hubei, enclosed in Rowley to Andrews, 3 Sept. 1925. At the Washington Conference of 1921-22, powers including Britain, France, USA and Japan promised to examine China's right to set her own tariffs on foreign trade and to help China establish a modern legal system in preparation for her eventual abolition of extra-territoriality.

⁵⁹ MMS 964 Hubei Chair/Gen 375, The Chapman Statement, enclosed in Chapman to Andrews, 17 Aug. 1925.

⁶⁰ MMS 964/376, J. S. Helps to Andrews, 2 Nov. 1925.

⁶¹ MMS 963/964 Hubei Gen/Chair 367, Andrews to Rowley, 19 Nov. 1925.

board of management. It also required the abolishment of compulsory religious worship. Although the Mission House was reluctant to give up religion courses and was also unwilling to allow Chinese to take over the financial management of the schools, most of the educational workers in the field welcomed registration and believed it to be inevitable. In the strained atmosphere of 1926, Stanley H. Dixon and Chapman decided to resign their posts as the principals of the Wesley College and Central China's Teachers' College (CCTC) respectively in favour of Chinese heads.⁶² Without consulting the Mission House, Dixon went a step further by appointing Shen as his successor. He and his colleagues also drafted a new constitution by which the college would be largely controlled by a Chinese-dominated committee.⁶³ Dixon was confident that the Mission House would approve his actions. He explained to London the reason of his resignation as follows:

If a Chinese head was to be installed at all during the present few years, that was the time, provided that a suitable man was forthcoming, and whether W. C. Shen [Shen Wenqing] justifies his appointment or not, I feel convinced that we took the right step, and showed a suitable combination of courage and humility. A little consideration will make it clear that it is much easier for W. C. Shen to be Head and myself No. 2, than vice versa, especially considering that it is China, and that the man concerned is W. C. Shen. He would probably be a mere nonentity as No.2; it would be difficult to pin him down to real responsibilities; the cramped character of his position (as it would appear to him) would make it unattractive as a field for work; Hankow [Hankou] would hardly be willing to relinquish him for such a position; and the difficulties of Chinese and foreign relationships might be made worse rather than better. As a matter of fact a great deal of the work still falls to me while Shen discharges the Chinese end of the business with success and efficiency, and shows to people outside in a concrete symbolic way that from the Chinese standpoint we really mean business, that we are actually working for the benefit of China and what is most important of all, we do genuinely believe in the Chinese.⁶⁴

The Mission House, however, was unhappy with Dixon's decision. Not only did they look upon the procedure as irregular, but they did not consider Shen to be qualified for the post.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, they eventually approved both the appointment of Shen and the modified constitution because, as they admitted, the mood in China in 1926-

⁶² MMS 964/368, Rowley to Andrews, 10 Feb. 1926; MMS 964/370, Rowley to Andrews, 23 Nov. 1926.

⁶³ MMS 964/368, Rowley to Andrews, 23 Feb. 1926.

⁶⁴ MMS 964 Hubei Chair/Gen 375, S. H. Dixon to Andrews, 7 May 1926.

⁶⁵ MMS 964/368, Andrews to Rowley, 30 March and 9 April 1926.

27 made it practically impossible for them to undo what Dixon had done.⁶⁶

Having worked among students and soldiers since the early 1920s, Shen was one of the leading Chinese missionaries in Wuhan. He was known to both the Chinese Christian community and to Mission House for regularly doing Christian work among General Feng Yu-xiang's troops, and for attending several Methodist conferences in Britain as the Chinese delegate.⁶⁷ His appointment as the first Chinese principal of Wesley College eased the tension in the college to a certain degree. Wesley college had been forced to close down in June 1925 owing to a students' strike and the threat that school buildings would be burnt down.⁶⁸ The number of students decreased dramatically by 147 to 88 when it opened in the autumn.⁶⁹ But in the spring of 1926, with the appointment of Shen as the head, and the positive effect of the new constitution, student numbers rose again and it was recognized that 'there is quite a different spirit in the school'.⁷⁰ Moreover, when most of the British institutions were hit by strikes at the end of 1926, Wesley College was not affected.⁷¹

Two WMMS establishments, Hodge Memorial Hospital and CCTC, were seriously affected by the strikes of 1926. The former experienced the rebellion of its nurses, while the latter had its Chinese vice-principal and also proposed principal, Xia Minyu, insulted and locked up for 18 hours in a student riot because of Xia's sympathy with the northern government. The integration of the interests of the British and Chinese mission elites, however, helped in resolving these troubles. Jiang, representing the doctors, per-

⁶⁶ MMS 964/381, Andrews to Dixon, 12 Feb. 1927.

⁶⁷ William Goudie, 'The centenary celebration: memories of a great week', *Foreign Field* (Dec. 1913), p. 90; W.T.A. Barber, 'In the land of the pagoda', *Foreign Field* (Oct. 1915), pp. 31-2; George Miles, 'A mass-movement in a Chinese army: The Rev. Shen Wen Ch'ing baptises over 1,100 soldiers', *Foreign Field* (March 1920), pp. 91-3; MMS 961A/328, Hill to Andrews, 11 Dec. 1920; MMS 961A/332, G. Miles to Andrews, 14 Nov. 1919.

⁶⁸ MMS 963/964 Hubei Gen/Chair 367, G. Mathew Thomas to Andrews, 24 July 1925.

⁶⁹ MMS 964/378, Thomas to Andrews, 5 Nov. 1925.

⁷⁰ MMS 964 Hubei Chair/Gen 375, Dixon to Andrews, 26 March 1926; MMS 964/380, Dixon to Andrews, 21 Sept. 1926.

⁷¹ Wesley College did not open on time in the autumn of 1926 owing to the attack of the Nationalist army on Wuhan, but it managed to open half-term in November. Although there was a great tension caused by the problem of compulsory religious worship and instruction, there was no student riot or strike from within. See MMS 964/380, Dixon to Andrews, 21 Sept. 1926; MMS 964/381, Dixon to Andrews, 5 Oct. 1926; MMS 964/370, Rowley to Andrews, 9 Dec. 1926.

suaded the nurses to go back to work in return for improved working conditions and better pay. At the CCTC, Xia agreed to resign so as to release the school from the pressure of the nationalist government. The college settled the matter by both declaring that the future principal would be a 'suitable' Chinese, and by pre-dating a rule and giving certificates to students who had finished two years' courses and let them leave.⁷²

Not only did the Guomindang mobilize the masses to attack British institutes, but it tried to gain the support of Chinese ministers. At the end of 1926, Xu Qian, the chairman of the Provisional Joint Council of the Nationalist Government and of the Central Executive Committee of the Guomindang, met Christians in Wuhan. Xu, who was also a Christian, suggested at the meeting that Chinese ministers should give up their denominations and form a super-church under the Nationalist Party. He argued that as the purpose of both the Guomindang and Christ was to 'cast down the wealthy and exalt the poverty-stricken', there should be no conflict between true Christians and the Nationalist Party, and relations between the Church and the Party could be put on a proper footing by the acceptance of the religion principle of the Guomindang.⁷³

Soon after the meeting, Chinese ministers met at Hankou to consider how to respond to Xu's speech and the anti-Christian campaign. Determining to draw a line between them and the British hated by the Guomindang, they agreed that imperialism was an enemy of Christianity and resolved to start a reform movement to remove the imperialist element in the churches. They announced at the end of the meeting: 'If any missionary loves his country more than he loves Christ, and is unwilling to further the present reform movements among our people, will he speedily return to his native land.'⁷⁴

This statement, added to the recent political upheavals, upset a lot of missionaries in Wuhan and many felt so depressed that they insisted upon having immediate furlough.⁷⁵ The way in which Britain surrendered her Hankou Concession in early 1927 further suggested a gloomy future for missionary work in China. The Nanjing Incident of March 1927, in which Nationalist forces looted the city and killed six foreigners, added to this pessimism. Thus, after evacuating

⁷² MMS 964/370, Rowley to Andrews, 23 Nov. 1926.

⁷³ MMS 964/380, Clayton to Andrews, 27 Dec. 1926.

⁷⁴ MMS 964/371, Rowley to Andrews, 25 Dec. 1926.

⁷⁵ MMS 964/370, Rowley to Andrews, 9 Dec. 1926; Cables: 10 and 28 Dec. 1926.

women and children to Shanghai, the WMMS ordered its Wuhan mission to retain only those staff that were absolutely necessary, and to send the rest home.⁷⁶ In May 1927, the Mission House decided to transfer the returned missionaries to England as it seemed unlikely that they would be able to return to China in the near future.⁷⁷ Rumours about Wuhan after the evacuation, including paper dollars having become worthless, circulated in Shanghai. These and the confusing political situation in China led the British Missionary Societies to pessimism.⁷⁸

The evacuation of early 1927 removed most of the conservative elements from the Wuhan mission, and the responsibility for decision-making fell to those who remained. The views of these people toward China tended to be more positive. The earlier resolutions of tension also helped to unify the interests and views of the British and Chinese mission elites. Chinese missionaries such as Jiang and Shen, for example, were optimistic about the new regime and its religion policy.⁷⁹ Jiang was particularly thrilled with the nationalism aroused by the Guomindang and the possibility of Wuhan becoming the capital of the whole of China. At the end of 1926, when the Mission House was deeply worried about the situation in China, Jiang sent C. W. Andrews, the China Secretary of the Mission House, a letter elaborating the Guomindang's 'Three People's Principles', i.e. nationalism, democracy and people's livelihood. Jiang emphasized in his letter that 'there is reason to believe that this state of things seems to be a passing phase of social reconstruction at this transitional period' and that 'it is our sincerest hope that the level-headed and far-sighted leaders [in the nationalist government] will endeavour to bring about a strong, central stable and progressive government at the earliest possible date so that the Chinese people may truly enjoy the fruits of the revolution—equality, liberty, peace and order.'⁸⁰ Shen also revealed his optimism in December 1927 when reviewing political events with H. B. Rattenbury, the district chairman. He proudly asked Rattenbury to tell the

⁷⁶ MMS 964/370, Andrews to Rattenbury, Cable, 21 Jan. 1927; MMS 964/373, Rattenbury to Andrews, 4 May 1927.

⁷⁷ MMS 964/373, Andrews to Rattenbury, 6 May 1927.

⁷⁸ MMS 964/374, Rattenbury to Andrews, 18 July 1927; MMS 964/373, Andrews to Rattenbury, 24 April 1927.

⁷⁹ MMS 964/370, Rowley to Andrews, 23 Nov. and 9 Dec. 1926

⁸⁰ MMS 964/380, Jiang to Andrews, 8 Dec. 1926.

British churches: 'tell them we have lost some furniture, but we have not lost our spirit.'⁸¹ As for the remaining foreign missionaries, including Rattenbury, Dixon, H. Owen Chapman, C. Stanley Minty, Ernest H. Livesley and W. Rowley, they believed that 'the present happenings are throes of birth to a new life through which China must pass', and that they could best help China by staying, watching and helping where possible until a better day came.⁸²

Thus although both the missionaries in Shanghai and at home took a pessimistic view of Britain's future in China, those remaining in Wuhan still believed that they would be able to rebuild their work one day. The chance to reconcile with radical China came in May 1927 when leaders in the nationalist government, including Xu, Wang Jingwei, Gu Mengyu, Madame Sun Yat-sen (Song Qingling) and Madame Liao Zhongkai (He Xiangning), tried to organize Red-Cross work in Hankou in preparation for the large numbers of wounded expected from fighting in the north.⁸³ To both the foreign missionaries and the Chinese Christians, this development was a godsend in that it was an opportunity to demonstrate the practical side of the Christian life and faith.⁸⁴ Thus when wounded soldiers started to pour into Hankou, all the mission hospitals were involved and Jiang acted as the agent of the WMMS.

Jiang was in sole charge of the Hodge Memorial Hospital, as most of the European medical workers had left Central China. In addition to the daily operation of the hospital, he also represented the WMMS in all the negotiations with the nationalist government. When the Red Cross was first organized, the government intended to take over the hospital. Jiang successfully made an arrangement with them by which the mission retained control and helped to care for the wounded.⁸⁵ Backed by the support of his foreign colleagues, Jiang and the hospital staff became actively involved in the Red Cross work. They first stretched their accommodation facilities to the utmost, and then took over neighbouring buildings and used them as annexes. When the wounded continued to pour in, they closed

⁸¹ W. H. Pillow, 'May we expect a Christward movement in China?', *Foreign Field* (Oct. 1928), p. 20.

⁸² MMS 964/371, Rowley to Andrews, 25 Dec. 1926.

⁸³ MMS 964/374, Rattenbury to Andrews, 27 May 1927.

⁸⁴ MMS 964/374, Rattenbury to Andrews, 23 June 1927.

⁸⁵ C. S. Minty, 'Tending the Chinese wounded', *Foreign Field* (Dec. 1927), pp. 64-6; MMS 964/374, Rattenbury to Andrews, 27 May 1927.

down the nearby school for the blind and used it as a temporary hospital.⁸⁶ All the foreign missionaries, regardless of whether they had medical training, went out from the former Concession every day to help Jiang, and returned at night. Chinese Christian ladies also volunteered to work in the hospital, apparently 'not shrinking from the task of binding up gaping wounds' in the hot summer.⁸⁷ Jiang's performance in 1927 was praised by his foreign colleagues:

Dr Chiang [Jiang] has helped to make it possible for us to retain our hospital buildings and equipment. And more than once, when truculent soldiers and officers, who were patients, made all sorts of impossible demands, or smashed hospital crockery, or even struck our nurses and showed revolvers to add force to their threats, and made themselves generally obnoxious, Dr Chiang, by his coolness and resource, put things right again.⁸⁸

When the battle got fiercer and the expenses of Red Cross became heavy, Rattenbury called on the medical missionaries in Shanghai to help, and also appealed to the WMMS board for financial support. With the assistance of the British consul-general in Hankou, he was successful in getting many medical workers to join them.⁸⁹ On the issue of financial support, the answer from London was that the Chinese should bear the cost of the medical service being offered by the mission. Andrews replied frankly, 'I do not quite see how we could have expected any success [in appealing to the British public for money in this connection] because the general feeling in this country is that if the Chinese militants can amass millions—as we were told they were doing—they ought not to come, cap in hand, to us for money'.⁹⁰

Rattenbury, Jiang and their colleagues were not upset by Andrews' reply because they recognized that what they had done was 'more than tons of propaganda could have done to stop the mouths of the anti-Christians'.⁹¹ Moreover, although the decision to get involved in the Red Cross work was initially for protecting their hospital from being seized by the nationalist government, once the wounded began to pour into Hankou, helping them was looked upon as a Christian

⁸⁶ H. Owen Chapman, *The Chinese Revolution 1926–1927: A Record of the Period under Communist Control as Seen from the Nationalist Capital* (London: 1928), pp. 180–1; MMS 964/374, Rattenbury to Andrews, 13 July 1927.

⁸⁷ Minty, 'Tending the Chinese wounded', p. 66.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

⁸⁹ MMS 964/374, Rattenbury to Hunter, 22 June 1927.

⁹⁰ MMS 964/374, Andrews to Rattenbury, 12 July 1927.

⁹¹ MMS 964/374, Rattenbury to Andrews, 4 July 1927.

duty. In the medical service, the missionaries even sympathized with their erstwhile enemies and the strong nationalist feeling among the soldiers.⁹² Their decision to stay, wait and help proved to be wise: in 1928, when it became possible to carry out normal mission work in Central China once again, they were on the spot to resume their work and rebuild their institutions.

Conclusion

The evidence examined in this paper indicates that resolutions of tension in the WMMS mission in Wuhan between 1916 and 1920 helped to integrate the interests of British and Chinese mission elites. This development, in turn, contributed to the mission's survival during Nationalist Revolution of 1925–28. A general trend of sinification of church and mission organizations followed soon after the Revolution. In the case of the WMMS in Wuhan, most of the conservative missionaries left after the evacuation and did not come back in 1928, which helped to speed up the process of change in the mission's policies and attitude.

This paper suggests that relations between the foreign missionaries and Chinese Christians were more complicated than has so far been understood. While missions with different nationalities operated in different ways, it shows that, even in individual missions, some missionaries were more aware of the need to reconcile with a rapidly-changing China than were others. The divergent opinions among the missionaries about how to respond to China's nationalist appeals corresponded roughly with the different 'generations' of missionaries in China. The so-called 'old China hands', who had been in China for more than twenty years and who believed that they 'knew' the Chinese well, were more inclined to resist new ideas; while those who supported radical changes in their policy and attitude towards China were often the 'new' arrivals. Generally the doctors and teachers tended to be the most flexible in this regard.

The British functioned in China through a host of Chinese intermediaries including compradores, agents, and men like Jiang and Shen. These middlemen shared the basic British aims of profit and proselytization, and worked for or with the British. But their

⁹² MMS 964/374, Circular letter by Rattenbury, received in London: 22 July 1927.

intermediary position often put them in an awkward or uncomfortable spot, particularly in tumultuous periods like that of 1925–28. In the WMMS mission in Wuhan, patriotism, religious belief and fear of being identified with the foreigners made Jiang and Shen sources of tension. They had to balance their own nationalist feelings with the interests of the mission in such a way as to convince other Chinese that they could be patriotic even though they were employed by a foreign institute.

In a more general way, the successful lobbying for status and security carried out by Shen and Jiang shows that both men were thinking and acting in understandably self-serving ways. Whatever the complaints about their tactics, they were professionals and wanted to be treated as professionals. This is actually part of the trend of the professionalization of Chinese elites since the late Qing.⁹³ The different reactions of the missionaries, on the other hand, reflected again the division between the preaching evangelists and those in educational and medical work. While the latter group was ready to give way quickly, it took longer for the former to realize that they were dealing with proud professionals rather than arrogant Chinese.

The cases of Jiang and Shen also highlight the issue of cultural conflict between Britons and Chinese in Chinese missionary circles. Different conceptions of family duty, different traditions of honour and proper behaviour in the workplace, and different approaches to resolving conflicts caused misunderstanding. Because they did not fully comprehend Chinese social behaviour, some of the British missionaries who became involved with the issue of Jiang's resignation displayed an intrusive arrogance in their handling of his case. In addition to these culturally-based misunderstandings and conflicts, the cases of Jiang and Shen reveal the distrusted position of Chinese within the mission and its organizations, because of underlying racism. This is probably one of the reasons why during the 1920s and 1930s the Chinese Christian elites endeavoured to create an indigenous Chinese Church independent of foreign missionary societies.

⁹³ For the development of this trend, see Andrew J. Nathan, *Peking Politics, 1918–1923—Factionalism and the Failure of Constitutionalism* (London: 1976), pp. 13–18; David Strand, *Rickshaw Beijing—City People and Politics in the 1920s* (London: 1989), pp. 18–19; Alison W. Conner, 'Lawyers and the Legal Profession during the Republican Period', in Kathryn Bernhardt and Philips C. C. Huang (eds.), *Civil Law in Qing and Republican China* (Stanford: 1994), pp. 215–48.